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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-STRICT LIABILITY IN TORT: DEFECT NEED NOT
RENDER PRODUCT "UNREASONABLY DANGEROus"-Cronin v. J.B.E.
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972).
Plaintiff Cronin was injured when the bread delivery truck he was
driving for his employer collided with another vehicle. An aluminum
safety hasp designed to hold the truck's bread racks in place failed
during the collision; as a result, plaintiff was pushed forward through
the windshield of the truck and injured seriously. Plaintiff's expert
witness testified that the hasp was unusually weak because of bubbles
and organic matter in the metal, that the hasp would have withstood
the forces exerted by the racks during the collision had it not been
flawed, and that the flaws and weakness of the metal were present at
the time of manufacture, not caused by fatigue during use. Cronin
obtained judgment against defendant Olson Corporation, original
seller of the assembled bread truck, on the basis of strict liability in
tort. Olson sought reversal on the ground that the trial court had re-
fused to require Cronin to prove that the truck's defective condition
(due to the faulty safety hasp) made it "unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer."' The California Supreme Court unanimously af-
firmed, holding in Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp.2 that the manufac-
turer is strictly liable in tort for all injuries proximately caused by its
defective products; the defect need not make the product unreason-
ably dangerous to the user or consumer.
The California courts have pioneered the development of strict lia-
bility in tort; California's experiences with the evolving rules sur-
rounding the doctrine may be expected to have great impact on the
law in her sister states. This note will examine the popular rationales
and other factors which may account for, but do not justify, the use of
an "unreasonably dangerous" requirement in strict liability cases. It
will be shown that this requirement added nothing of substance to the
I. Olson also argued that proximate causation between the defect and plaintiffs in-
juries was not established, since the hasp did not cause the collision. This argument was
rejected summarily by the court, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1"153, 1157, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 437. California essentially has adopted the reasoning in Larsen v. General
Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). See Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13
Cal. App. 3d 81, 91 Cal. Rptr. 301 (1970), where it was held that a manufacturer may
be held liable for failing to make a product safer for foreseeable misuse by a consumer.
2. 8Cal. 3d 121,501 P.2d 1153, 104Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
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elements of strict liability in tort but was simply a stumbling block for
plaintiffs. It was repetitive of other elements of the tort and imported
vague overtones of negligence confusing to a jury hearing a strict lia-
bility case. Stripping away the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement
reveals the two core elements of strict liability in tort in California: a
"defective" product and its proximate causation of an injury. This
note will describe the contours of both elements.
I. THE GREENMAN RULE AND THE RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
In the premier California products liability case, Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.,3 the California Supreme Court held that
strict liability in tort is not governed by contract warranty principles,
but by separate principles of risk distribution. "A manufacturer is
strictly liable in tort," Justice Traynor wrote for the court, "when an
article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a
human being."' 4 This language has come to be known as the "Green-
man rule" and has been cited repeatedly by courts in California as
definitive of the California products liability rule.5 Greenman made
no mention of a requirement that the defect make the product "unrea-
sonably dangerous."
Two years after Greenman was decided, the Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 402A was published in its final form. 6 The Restatement
expounded a rule of strict liability similar to that in Greenman but
added the requirement that the product in question be in a defective
condition "unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer."
3. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
4. 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
5. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168. 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964); Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84. 75
Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969); Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr.
178 (1970). See also R. CARTWRIGHT & J. COTCHETr, CALIFORNIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY
ACTIONS 422-27 (1970). The Cronin court reaffirmed the Greenman test as being defini-
tive, 8 Cal. 3d at 129-30, 501 P.2d at 1158-59, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438-39.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) reads in full as follows:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property. if
(a) the seller is engaged in thebusiness of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
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The California court in Cronin did not attempt to explain the occa-
sional use of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" in past California
cases or to examine the Restatement's reasons for the dual require-
ments of defect and unreasonable danger. Rather than discuss cases
which had mentioned the § 402A requirements, 7 the court brushed
them aside with the observation that very little could be gleaned from
the mention of the Restatement rule in California cases because, until
Cronin, no conflict between it and Greenman on the question of "un-
reasonable danger" had arisen.8 Similarly, the Court did not question
the validity of the Restatement's rationale for the additional require-
ment of unreasonable danger; it simply indicated that in the past it
had exercised its prerogative to ignore the Restatement § 402A re-
strictions on strict liability,9 and that the mere mention of § 402A in
strict liability cases did not signify California's assent to each of that
section's provisions. The court found the "unreasonably dangerous"
element objectionable because it tended to make plaintiffs establish
the manufacturer's negligence, 10 and it accordingly had no qualms
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
7. The following California Supreme Court cases mentioned the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement: Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229,
85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970); Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d
681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971).
The following California Court of Appeals cases mentioned the requirement: Canifax
v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965); Gherna v. Ford
Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966); Harris v. Belton, 258
Cal. App. 2d 595, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968); Read v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 264 Cal. App.
2d 404, 70 Cal. Rptr. 454 (1968); Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d
228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d
331, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969); Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals, 272 Cal. App. 2d
645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969); Grinnell v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 424, 79
Cal. Rptr. 369 (1969); Badorek v. General Motors Corp., I I Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 305 (1970); Putensen v. ClayAdams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062,91 Cal. Rptr. 319
(1970); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); Lewis v.
American Hoist and Derrick Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 570, 97 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971); Silver-
hart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971); Kasel v.
Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr. 314 (1972) (conflict of laws);
Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972).
8. 8Cal. 3d 121 at 131,501 P.2d 1153 at 1161, 104Cal. Rptr. 433 at441.
9. 8 Cal. 3dat 131, 501 P.2d at 1160, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 440. The court cited Price v.
Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970), where the appar-
ently restricted applicability of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A to sellers was
put aside and a strict liability recovery allowed against a lessor of gasoline trucks.
10. 8 Cal. 3d at 132-33, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
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about eliminating the requirement. Although the California court
found it unnecessary to undertake a critical examination of the Re-
statement's rationale or a careful analysis of past case law, such investi-
gation would have vindicated the position taken in Cronin.
The Restatement's rationale for the "unreasonably dangerous" re-
quirement, found in Comments i, j and k to § 402A, is that although
many desirable products can be dangerous under some circumstances,
liability should not follow if the dangers are of the type to be expected
from the products. Comment i states that an expected danger is not
"unreasonable."1 This "unreasonably dangerous" requirement was
supposedly included to shield from liability manufacturers of products
that are ordinarily safe to use but which necessarily contain some pos-
sibility of harm) 2 Comment k deals with "unavoidably unsafe" prod-
ucts, such as the Pasteur rabies vaccine, whose dangers, though sub-
stantial, are not so serious as the dangers they eliminate. "Such a
product," says the Comment, "properly prepared, and accompanied
by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreason-
ably dangerous."13
Certainly all products which are unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer would be adjudged "defective" as that term is com-
monly understood by the Restatement and the courts of California. 14
It follows that a product which is not defective can not be unreason-
ably dangerous. The "unavoidably unsafe" products described in
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment i at 352-53 (1965) reads in
pertinent part:
[M]any products cannot possibly be made entirely safe for all consumption,
and any food or drug necessarily involves some risk of harm, if only from
over-consumption . . . . The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it. with
the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
See note 21 infra regarding the use of the consumer's expectations as a test of defective-
ness.
12. Prosser. Strict Liability to the Consmer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9.
23-26 (1966).
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment k at 353-54 (1965). Com-
ment k reads in pertinent part as follows:
Unavoidably tnsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use . . . . Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by
proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it ttnreasonably
dangerous ....
14. See note 56 infra regarding the definition of "defect" in the RESTATEMENT and
note 22 infra regarding the definition of "defect- in California. See also Jiminez v.
Sears. Roebuck & Co., 4 Cal. 3d 379. 482 P.2d 681.93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971).
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Comment k, when properly prepared and accompanied by adequate
warning, are not defective according to the Comment, and therefore
injuries arising out of the use of these unavoidably dangerous products
will not give rise to strict tort liability. The "unreasonably dangerous"
test serves no purpose in such cases, for the result is completely deter-
mined by a finding of no defect.
The requirement is similarly unnecessary when the product is
defective. However, while all unreasonably dangerous products are
defective, a product can be defective, under some definitions of "de-
fect," without being unreasonably dangerous. 15 For these products, it
might be suggested, the "unreasonably dangerous" test is necessary to
prevent trivial defects from giving rise to liability. But while it is easy
to conceive of a defective but not unreasonably dangerous product,16
it is difficult to imagine that a defect whose risk of harm was so foresee-
able that it would be held the proximate cause of the injury would not
also be found "unreasonably dangerous."'17 Thus the additional "un-
reasonably dangerous" requirement is superfluous both when the
product in question is defective and when it is not. Consequently, the
requirement does not materially further the purpose of protecting the
legitimate concerns of manufacturers of unavoidably dangerous prod-
ucts or of the society which demands, but may be injured by, those
products.
A similar conclusion can be drawn regarding those products dis-
cussed in Comment i. While Comment k refers to "unavoidably un-
safe" products which are "quite incapable of being made safe for their
intended or ordinary use," Comment i refers to products with lesser
unavoidable dangers which "cannot possibly be made entirely safe for
all consumption."' 8 The dangers mentioned in Comment i appear to
be quite as unavoidable as those in Comment k, the only difference
between them being the degree of danger involved. Comment k "una-
voidably unsafe" products are apparently never safe for ordinary use,
while Comment i products appear to be safe for most consumption,
though not totally harm-free. If the more dangerous Comment k prod-
15. See note 22 infra.
16. An example of a defective but not unreasonably dangerous product might be
an automobile with exterior paint that blisters and peels off easily when exposed to
the sun.
17. See note 14 supra.
18. See note II supra.
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ucts, properly prepared and accompanied by adequate warning, are
not defective solely by reason of their large but unavoidable hazards,
neither should the safer Comment i products, if similarly free from
defects in other respects, be rendered defective by their smaller una-
voidable hazards. The manufacturers of Comment i products there-
fore are protected, as are the manufacturers of Comment k "una-
voidably unsafe" products, because their products, if properly pre-
pared and accompanied by adequate warning, are not defective even
though they may cause injury; furthermore, even if their products are
defective for some reason, they must proximately cause injury before
liability can arise. The "unreasonably dangerous" requirement is an
added element of plaintiffs burden of proof which can find no policy
justification in either Comment i or Comment k.
It has been suggested here as axiomatic that an unreasonably dan-
gerous product is ipso facto defective. According to Comment j to §
402A, a product which is safe for use when accompanying warn-
ings are followed is neither unreasonably dangerous nor defective.'
When a warning could render use of a product safe, and if adequate
warning is given, the product is not defective (according to Com-
ment j); if the warning is inadequate, the product is automatically
unreasonably dangerous and ipso facto defective. The danger is auto-
matically "unreasonable" because any increased danger due to nondis-
closure would almost certainly outweigh the slight utility of not
making the effort to disclose. Under any definition of "defect," more-
over, such an unnecessary and easily avoided danger to the unwary
consumer surely would be held to constitute a defect as well; the
danger is unavoidable,2 0 not contemplated by the consumer,2 1 and
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 402A, Comment j at 3)3 (1965). Com-
mentj reads in pertinent part as follows:
Directions or warning. In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably
dangerous, the seller may be required to give directions or warning, on the con-
tainer, as to its use .... Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably as-
sume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which
is safe for use if it is followed, is not in a defective condition, nor is it unreason-
ably dangerous (emphasis added).
20. Dean Prosser has suggested avoidability of danger as a key factor in deter-
mining defectiveness and the applicability of strict liability in tort. See 18 HASTINGS L.J.
9, 23-26 (1966). Comments i and k to § 402A tell us that unavoidable hazards do not
render a product defective. The inference that products with avoidable dangers are
defective is not unfair, if the term "avoidable" is properly defined. "Avoidable" is used
here, in keeping with common understanding, to refer to those dangers whose costs of
elimination do not exceed the costs of the injuries they cause. Hazards which cannot
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"unreasonably dangerous" 22 to him. Where failure to provide a
needed warning is shown, the statement that the product is also "un-
reasonably dangerous" adds nothing to the inevitable finding of defec-
tiveness, nor, where the product is rendered safe by adequate warning,
does the statement that the product is "not unreasonably dangerous"
add anything to the inevitable finding of no defectiveness. Although
the findings may be triggered for distinguishable reasons, the point
remains that in warning cases defective products are coextensive with
dangerous products, and the requirement of a dual showing of defect
be avoided economically are "unavoidable." "Avoidability," thus understood, is a
viable determinant of defectiveness which embodies the same principles as the
"unreasonably dangerous" test.
21. If the consumer were aware of the hazard, the warning would be unne-
cessary. The question of what the consumer contemplates or is led to expect is another
possible determinant of defectiveness. See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defec-
tive Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Traynor]. The popularity of the consumer's expectation as a determinant of defective-
ness stems from the warranty background of strict liability and the influence of the
UCC. Dean Prosser states that "[t] he prevailing interpretation of 'defective' is that the
product does not meet the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer as to its
safety." PROSSER, TORTS § 99 at 659 (4th ed. 1971). The difficulty with using the expecta-
tions of the consumer as a gauge of defectiveness is that the consumer arguably expects
those features of products of which he is aware; if the consumer is aware of a patently
dangerous design feature of a product when he buys it, then the danger conforms to his
expectation and the product could not be "defective" under this definition. Neither the
Greenman rule nor § 402A requires that the injured plaintiff be unaware of the dan-
gerous design feature. Such a requirement was expressly rejected by the California Su-
preme Court in Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 144-45, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 443, 449 (1973), decided the same day as Cronin.
22. This definition of defect seems to be the one envisioned by the RESTATEMENT. See
Wade, Strict Liability for Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 14-17 (1965), where it is also
pointed out that the dual requirement of defect and unreasonable danger is redundant,
though it is suggested there that the notion of defect be dropped and unreasonable
danger retained. Professor Wade recognizes the alternative of eliminating "unreasonable
danger" and retaining the "defect" requirement and mentions some advantages of
each alternative.
A product unreasonably dangerous because of a failure to warn or because of a de-
sign feature is "defective" under two of the three possible California definitions of that
term delineated in Jiminez (see text accompanying notes 67-69 infra): (1) A defect is ob-
viously synonymous with an "unreasonably dangerous feature" when a defect is defined
as an unreasonably dangerous feature; (2) a product which is "unreasonably dangerous"
will only rarely be "reasonably fit for its intended purpose," and it is therefore "defec-
tive" if "defect" is so defined; but (3) a whole product line could be designed or mar-
keted in such a way that the use of any individual sample would be unreasonably dan-
gerous, yet that sample would not be "defective," if "defect" is defined as a "deviation
from the norm."
The definition of a defect as a "deviation from the norm" would not contain unrea-
sonably dangerous warning or design features within its scope. This definition, to the
extent that it operates to exclude such unreasonably dangerous design features, is not
accepted by the California courts or by the RESTATEMENT. For the California Supreme
Court's inclusion of design defects in strict liability cases, see note 42 infra.
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and unreasonable danger is as redundant and cumbersome in Com-
mentj as it is in Comments i and k.
Nevertheless, while the Restatement requirement (explained in
Comments i, j and k) that the defect cause the product to be "unrea-
sonably dangerous" was not in the older California jury instructions,2 3
it was later incorporated in a newer version of those instructions.2 4
The instruction actually given by the trial judge in Cronin, however,
23. The manufacturer [retailer] of an article who places it on the market for use
under circumstances where he knows that such article will be used without inspec-
tion for defects, is liable for injuries proximately caused by defects in the manufac-
ture or design of the article of which the user was not aware provided the article
was being used for the purpose for which it was designed and intended to be used.
COMMITTEE OF STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, SUPERIOR COURT OF Los ANGELES
COUNTY, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL (BOOK OF APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS)
No. 218-A (5th ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as BAJI ]. BAJI is generally regarded as the
accepted text on instructions throughout California. R. CARTWRIGHT & J. COTCHETT,
CALIFORNIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS 420 (1970). Note the close similarity
between the above instruction and the Greenman test.
24. The defendant . . . is not required under the law so to create and deliver its
product as to make it accident proof; however, he is liable to the plaintiff for any
injury suffered by him if the plaintiff establishes by a preponderance of the evid-
ence all of the facts necessary to prove each of the following conditions:
First: The defendant placed the ..... in question on the market for use. and the
defendant knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that the
particular ..... would be used without inspection for defects in the particular part,
mechanism or design which is claimed to have been defective;
Second: The ..... was defective in design or manufacture at the time it was placed
on the market and delivered;
Third: The plaintiff was unaware of the claimed defect;
Fourth: The claimed defect was a [proximate] [legal] cause of any such injury to
the plaintiff occurring while the ..... was being used in the way and for the general
purpose for which it was designed and intended, and
Fifth: The defect, if it existed, made the ..... unreasonably dangerous and unsafe
for its intended use.
[An article is unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.]
BAJI No. 9.00 (This instruction was revised after Cronin. See note 26 infra).
The [manufacturer] [retailer] of an article who places it on the market for use
under circumstances where he knows that such article will be used without inspec-
tion for defects in the particular part, mechanism, or design which is claimed to
have been defective, is liable for injuries proximately caused by defects in the
manufacture or design of the article which caused it to be unreasonably dangerous
and unsafe for its intended use and of which the user was not aware, provided the
article was being used for the purpose for which it was designed and intended to be
used.
[An article is unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the
ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.]
The plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence all
of the facts necessary to prove each of the foregoing conditions.
Id., No. 9.01 (This instruction was deleted after Cronin. See note 26 infra).
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was based on the older, then-current instruction.2 5 Defendant-appellant
Olson argued that the Restatement § 402A rule, as recognized in the
new instructions and as applied by the courts, represented the current
law of California; plaintiff argued that the Greenman rule was defini-
tive. After the latter view prevailed in Cronin, the California jury
instructions were again revised, and the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement was excised. 26
Cronin was unique in presenting the conflict between the two tests
on the question of "unreasonable danger." The Greenman rule and
the § 402A rule often had been cited together in California Supreme
Court and lower court opinions, the conflict between them not then
being perceived.27 Although several opinions had mentioned or even
25. The trial court instruction read in pertinent part as follow:
In this action, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence all of the facts necessary to prove the following issues as to each defendant
seller:
1. That the seller placed the equipment on the market for use under circum-
stances where he knew that such equipment would be used without inspection for
defects;
2. That there was a defect in the manufacture or design of the equipment. in-
volved;
3. That the user was not aware of the said defect;
4. That the equipment was being used for the purpose for which it was designed
and intended to be used;
5. That the injuries and damages complained of were proximately caused by the
said defect;
6. The nature and extent of the injuries and damages sustained by the plaintiff.
8 Cal. 3d at 128, 501 P.2d at 1158, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
26. The 1972 revision of BAJI (Supp. 1973), supra note 23, 9.00 reads as follows:
The - of an article is [liable] [subject to liability] for injuries proxi-
mately caused by a defect in the article which existed when the article left posses-
sion of the defendant [s], provided that the injury resulted from a use of the article
that was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant [s].
BAJI 9.01 was deleted in the 1972 revision. Id., 9.01.
27. The low degree of conflict between Greenman and the RESTATEMENT occasioned
by the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement can, perhaps, be accounted for by the fol-
lowing observation:
In the vast majority of products liability suits resulting in plaintiff's verdicts, it has
been relatively easy to determine that a product was unreasonably dangerous. Dif-
ficulties in applying the 'unreasonably dangerous' standard arise most frequently
when the product in question is unavoidably unsafe ....
Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence, and Strict Tort
Liability, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1350, 1374 (1966). The "difficulty" with unavoidably unsafe
products, of course, gave rise to the requirement that the products be unreasonably
dangerous.
The conflict between Greennan and the RESTATEMENT is recognized in R. CARTWRIGHT
& J. COTCHEi-r, CALIFORNIA PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTONS 420 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as R. CARTRIGHT & J. COTCHE-r-r]. The "unreasonably dangerous" requirement is
roundly criticized, and the Greenman rule suggested as the true test of liability in Cali-
fornia. The requirement (eliminated by Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163,
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explicitly stated the requirement, 28 the great majority had not. More-
over, as the Cronin court observed, 29 in none of the cases stating the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement did the decision turn on
whether the jury must decide the injuries were caused by a "defective"
product or by a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous."
While there is no reported California case in which the results turn
on the unreasonably dangerous requirement, Pike v. Frank G. Hough
Co.:0 has been cited to support the proposition that California has
adopted the Restatement requirement of an "unreasonably dangerous"
productA' Pike involved a paydozer alleged to be defective in design
solely because it lacked adequate safety devices (rear view mirrors and
back-up warnings). The Pike court recited the Greenman rule, referring
to Greenman as a "landmark opinion,"'32 but the court added that - [t] he
Restatement Second of Torts, section 402A succinctly recites the
standard for strict liability applicable to manufacturers." (emphasis
added).n The opinion was riddled with references to "unreasonable
risks" and "defective and dangerous" products, and it placed heavy
reliance on the reasoning of Greenman's Illinois counterpart, Suvada
v. White Motor Co., 34 which had adhered closely to the Restatement
rule and included the requirement that the defective condition be "un-
reasonably dangerous." After discussing Suvada, the California Su-
preme Court said in Pike: "We adopt a similar rule . . . . Whether
the paydozer was unreasonably dangerous . . . is clearly a question
of fact to be determined by the jury."35 This comment indicates that
the Pike court believed that the Greenman test embodies the "unrea-
sonably dangerous" requirement. Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,36
the only other California Supreme Court case interpreting Greenman
to permit an "unreasonably dangerous" requirement, relied on Pike to
104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972)) of plaintiffs unawareness of the defect is also criticized. Id.
at 426-28.
28. See note 7 supra.
29. 8Cal. 3dat 131,501 P.2dat 1161, 104Cal. Rptr. at441.
30. 2 Cal. 3d 465, 467 P.2d 229, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629 (1970).
31. See, e.g., Badorek v. General Motors Corp., I I Cal. App. 3d 902, 919, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 305, 315 (1970); Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1073. 91
Cal. Rptr. 319, 325 (1970)- Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hospital, 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022.
1027, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187, 189 (1971).
32. 2 Cal. 3d at 475, 467 P.2d at 235, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
33. 2 Cal. 3d at 475, 467 P.2d at 236, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 636.
34. 32111. 2d612,210N.E.2d 182(1965).
35. 2 Cal. 3d at 476, 467 P.2d at 237, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
36. 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971).
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establish as one permissible definition of a defective condition
"one which was 'unreasonably dangerous' to the user, consumer,
or bystander. (See Rest. 2d Torts § 402A)." As well as prompting
this statement in Jiminez, the Pike opinion has induced lower courts to
hold that California has adopted the Restatement rule,37 but none of
these cases actually negated the Greenman rule. The Pike opinion was
a major cause of the introduction of the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement into California case law, but it was not the only one.
II. FAILURE TO WARN, DESIGN DEFECTS AND THE
"UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS" REQUIREMENT
In California, nearly all the cases not relying on Pike as controlling
which mentioned unreasonable danger involved failure to warn.3 8
This frequent connection of the "unreasonably dangerous" require-
ment with the failure to warn indicates that factors other than solely
the prestige of the Restatement may have operated to introduce that
phrase into the products liability law of California. The mention of
the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement in California cases also
may be attributable to the desire to extend strict liability to manufac-
turers of dangerously designed products; this can be achieved either
by defining "defect" broadly enough to include dangerous design fea-
tures and making the manufacturer liable for injury caused by any
"defect" in his product, or by allowing liability for any injury caused
by an "unreasonably dangerous" design feature and not bothering to
label that feature a "design defect."
37. See note 31 supra.
Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., where the RESTATEMENT view appears to prevail, can be
partly accounted for under the "warning-connectedness" explanation of the term "un-
reasonably dangerous" discussed below. Pike was a "warning" case; the principal ques-
tion at issue in the case was whether a failure to provide safety devices (a design defect)
could, of itself, constitute a defect for strict liability purposes. In answering in the af-
firmative, the court analogized the failure to provide safety devices to the unreasonably
dangerous failure to warn. Hence, perhaps, the reference in Pike to "unreasonably dan-
gerous" products:
No rationale has been suggested to justify imposing strict liability with respect to a
faultlessly made product which is unreasonably dangerous because it is produced
without safety warnings, while refusing to impose strict liability with respect to a
product which is unreasonably dangerous because it is produced without safety
devices ....
2 Cal. 3d at 477, 467 P.2d at 237, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
38. For cases using "unreasonably dangerous" in connection with failure to warn,
see Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965)
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"Defect" sometimes has been defined narrowly as a "deviation from
the norm." This definition, it will be shown below, does not compre-
hend those features in products which otherwise would be labelled
"design defects." The relationship of defectiveness and unreasonable
danger in § 402A is, as has been shown, one in which the separate
element of unreasonable danger is superfluous because the test of
defectiveness is sufficient to produce the desired result in every case.
But under the narrower "deviation from the norm" definition of
defectiveness, this would not necessarily be the case; courts might
adopt an alternative phrase such as "unreasonably dangerous" to find
liability for injuries caused by dangerous design features which other-
wise would be left uncovered by the shrunken notion of defectiveness.
One proponent of this "deviation from the norm" definition is
Dean Keeton, who wrote in 1969:39
I, unlike the authors of the Restatement, would limit the use of the
word "defective" to the case of an unintended condition, a miscarriage
in the manufacturing process. Most of the decisions applying strict
liability notions have involved "defective" products in this limited
sense ....
Under this definition, design features which cause economically avoid-
(failure to give adequate notice of the burning time of a dynamite fuse could render the
dynamite "unreasonably dangerous" and serve as a foundation for strict liability): G herna
v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966) (flammability of auto
engine); Harris v. Belton, 258 Cal. App. 2d 595, 65 Cal. Rptr. 808 (1968) (warning ade-
quate to protect normal user is sufficient, hypersensitive user must protect self): Barth v.
B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968) (failure to dis-
close air pressure and load limitations constituted unreasonably dangerous defect):
Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 33 1, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1969)
(inadequate warnings accompanying ladder); Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural Chemicals.
272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969) (polio vaccine causes polio); Carmichael
v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971) (drug harms sensitive patient):
Lewis v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 570, 97 Cal. Rptr. 798 (197 1)
(question of fitness for intended purpose to be determined by referring to load capacity
warnings in instruction manual); Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d
633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1972) (plaintiff's hand crushed in press).
In the exhaustive list of California products liability cases mentioning the "un-
reasonably dangerous" requirement in note 7 supra, only two, Read v. Safeway
Stores, Inc. and Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., do not either mention failure to warn
or rely on Pike as controlling authority. Kasel dealt primarily with conflicts of law and
merely accepted BAJI, supra notes 23-24, No. 9.00, the then current jury instruction
(containing the unreasonably dangerous phrase), as representative of California law on
the subject.
39. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of"Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REv. 559. 562 (1969) (emphasis added)
[hereinafter cited as Keeton].
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able injuries are not "defects" because they are intended conditions of
the product, but they are "unreasonably dangerous" because the costs
of eliminating them are less than those of the injuries they cause. To
yield results which do not fly in the face of the established rule of
strict liability for injuries caused by products marketed with unreason-
ably dangerous design, 40 the Keeton approach apparently contemplates
that a showing of "defectiveness" is unnecessary in dangerous design
cases, and that a showing of "unreasonable danger" alone will suffice
in such cases. Thus, products that might otherwise be called "defective
in design" are termed instead "unreasonably dangerous" under the
Keeton view, but liability still follows. 41 The same criterion of avoida-
bility of injury can be applied regardless of which requirement is used,
and in this sense it hardly matters which is chosen. But if both a de-
sign defect and an unreasonably dangerous condition were to be re-
quired, as the Restatement seems to suggest by treating them as con-
junctive requirements, the cumulative effect would be to increase
plaintiff's burden of proof to the point of requiring a showing of neg-
ligence.
To the extent that the Keeton "deviation from the norm" definition
of "defect" holds sway, design defect cases will contain a required
showing of "unreasonable danger." Warning cases are likely to be
design defect cases because only dangers due to the known and in-
tended features of a product can be warned against, while the dangers
caused by sporadic errors in the manufacturing process are too varied
and unpredictable in nature to be the subject of a general warning to
consumers. A popular but narrow definition of "defect" can thus lead
to the felt need for the term "unreasonably dangerous" in cases in-
volving design features which cause injury, and these design cases are
often connected with failure to warn. Hence, perhaps, the fact that a
disproportionately large number of cases mentioning "unreasonable
danger" involved failure to warn.
40. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 99 at 659 nn.75 & 77 (4th ed. 1971):
[I] t is clear that the 'defect' need not be a matter of errors in manufacture, and that
a product is 'defective' when it is properly made according to an unreasonably
dangerous design, or when it is not accompanied by adequate instruction and
warning of the dangers attending its use.
See also note 35 supra.
41. See Keeton, supra note 39, at 563.
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It is desirable to settle upon a definition of "defective" or some other
term to describe the type of product whose ill effects are fairly charge-
able to the defendant manufacturer or seller. Either the Keeton ap-
proach should be adopted, and the requirement of unreasonable
danger treated as sufficient without a further "defect" requirement, or
the broader definition of defect should be maintained, as it was in
Cronin, with the recognition that an added requirement of "unreason-
able danger" is redundant because it duplicates the results of a test for
defectiveness. Dean Keeton's definition of "defect" may have the
virtue of conforming to commercial usage and to the layman's under-
standing of a defect as something accidental and unintended which
occurs in the manufacturing process, but his approach is not accepted
by the California Supreme Court.42 Nevertheless, use of the term "un-
reasonably dangerous" probably is attributable, at least in part, to the
widespread view which restricts the use of the term "defective" to
products manufactured in an accidentally improper fashion and does
not include those designed in an improper fashion.
III. THE MANUFACTURER AS "INSURER"
The Restatement attempts to justify the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement as necessary to encourage the manufacture of beneficial
but "unavoidably unsafe" products. This note has proffered a
"warning-connectedness" explanation for the appearance of the re-
quirement in design defect cases. In addition, it is often suggested that
the requirement is necessary to prevent the manufacturer from be-
coming an "insurer" or, rather, to avoid making the manufacturer
42. The California court has admitted that it has done little to explain what it means
by "defective." See, e.g., Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 130, 501 P.2d at 1160, 104 Cal. Rptr. 440.
But in Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 64, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, the court re-
ferred to defects in "design and manufacture," and in Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d at 134, 501 P.2d
at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442, the court stated:
We can see no difficulty in applying the Greenman formulation to the full range of
products liability situations, including those involving "design defects". A defect
may emerge from the mind of the designer as well as from the hand of the work-
man.
Both the Greenman and Cronin statements are dicta, since neither case involved a de-
sign defect, but the understanding of the California court of the possible scope of the
term "defect" is clear in Pike v. Frank G. Hough Co., 2 Cal. 3d 465, 476-77. 467
P.2d 229, 237, 85 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (1970).
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bear costs not properly allocable to him. 43 This argument was rejected
by the Cronin court:44
[W] e think that such protective end [protecting manufacturers
from excessive liability] is attained by the necessity of proving that
there was a defect in the manufacture or design of the product and that
such defect was a proximate cause of the injuries. Although the seller
should not be responsible for all injuries involving the use of its prod-
ucts, it should be liable for all injuries proximately caused by any of
its products which are adjudged "defective."
Labelling an injury-causing product "defective" is often in fact a
policy decision that the manufacturer should bear the risks arising
from products in that condition. Similarly, a finding of proximate
cause amounts to a policy decision that a particular injury should be
held to arise from the defectiveness of that product for purposes of
liability.45 The policy decision of whether a risk is properly allocable
43. See Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077,
1090 (1965), where the distinction is emphasized between "the voluntary undertaking to
insure an individual against a specified class of losses . . . and the imposition by law
of the duty to compensate for losses caused by defective products . . . . An 'insurer'
does not cause injury which he then compensates." An automobile insurance company
will compensate all injuries arising out of the operation of an automobile, while the
automobile manufacturer compensates only those injuries which are proximately caused
by a defect in the automobile. The manufacturer provides "insurance" only against
those injuries which he has caused by marketing a defective product.
It may be argued that the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" is needed to reflect the
limited extension of strict liability beyond unwholesome food cases to "products that
create as great or greater hazards if defective." See Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377
P.2d at 900, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 700. This phrase may be understood to mean that manufac-
turers of 'products whose defects would not likely lead to serious injury are exempt from
strict tort liability. The argument rests upon the notion that some products are more "in-
herently" or "imminently" dangerous than others. However, the attempted limitation to
"inherently" or "imminently" dangerous products was abandoned long ago in neglig-
ence cases and is equally untenable for strict liability cases. See Prosser, Strict Liability
to the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS LJ. 9, 21 (1966).
The "unreasonably dangerous" product is also reminiscent of the "ultrahazardous"
activity, though the analogy between the two is not apt. Dynamite, properly manufac-
tured and marketed, is not defective or "unreasonably dangerous," and the seller is not
liable for injury it causes; the user of the dynamite is engaged in an "ultrahazardous"
activity and is liable for injuries caused by his use regardless of how careful he is. Indeed,
it was because some products were unavoidably unsafe to use, and therefore not in-
reasonably dangerous to use, that the notion of "ultrahazardous" use was invented
as a means of placing the risk of harm on the user, who benefits most from the
dangerous activity.
44. 8 Cal. 3d at 133-34, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
45. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 42 (4th ed. 1971) and the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act, CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1794.3 (West 1973) which states:
The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to any defect or nonconformity in
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to a manufacturer can be made at either point, although the notion of
defectiveness, thanks to its commercial background, is not as purely
subjective as proximate cause.
With these opportunities available at trial to decide whether the
manufacturer ought to bear the risk of injury (the decision being
based more or less upon risk distribution reasoning, depending on
which definition of defect is adopted),46 nothing is gained by adding
"unreasonable danger" as another element of proof; certainly the test
for strict liability is not rendered more objective by the "unreasonably
dangerous" test, for it is at least as subjective in nature as the first two
elements mentioned. Much is lost, however, since the plaintiff is bur-
dened with convincing a jury of an element of proof with negligence
connotations .47
Notwithstanding the several explanations discussed above for the
use of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement, the requirement
has no real underlying justification in the doctrine of strict liability in
tort. Accordingly, the Cronin court properly eliminated it and reesta-
blished the two basic elements of liability required by the Greenman
rule-causation and defectiveness. With the "unreasonably danger-
ous" requirement eliminated in California, attention should focus
upon the proof required to satisfy these two elements of liability.
consumer goods caused by the unauthorized or unreasonable use of the goods fol-
lowing sale.
See also Preston v. Up-Right, Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 636, 52 Cal. Rptr. 679 (1966). up-
holding a trial court ruling that plaintiff had to show, as an element of recovery in a
strict liability case, that he was using the product in a reasonable way when injured.
While the court recognized that contributory negligence is not a defense in a strict lia-
bility case, it held that plaintiff must disprove any abuse of the product as part of his
burden of proving that a "defect" "caused" the accident.
46. See note 20 supra. See generally Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective
Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363 (1965); Prosser, Strict Liability to
the Consumer in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23-27 (1966); Wade, Strict Tort Lia-
bility of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 16-20 (1965); Keeton, Products Liability-
Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 398 (1970).
47. This is observed by the Cronin court, 8 Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162. 104
Cal Rptr. at 442. But see Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Designer Directions for
Use of a Product, 71 YALE L. J. 816, 838 (1962). See also Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1114 (1960), where the
similarity in burden of proof between negligence and strict liability cases is noted, the
author estimating that in less than one case in one hundred would recovery be denied if
the establishment of negligence were required in addition to the showing of a defect.
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IV. PROXIMATE CAUSE AND LEGAL CAUSE
Both Greenman and the Restatement stated only that the defect has
to "cause" the injury. Neither specified whether proximate cause4s or
the more relaxed standard of legal cause49 was contemplated. The
opinions between Greenman and Cronin lay no apparent stress on
establishing proximate causation, and several authorities have sug-
gested that the proximate cause standard, geared as it is to culpability,
should be relaxed or changed for products liability cases.5 0 Although
the Cronin court cited the Greenman test as controlling, it mentioned
the requirement of proving proximate causation as one of the seller's
remaining protections after elimination of the "unreasonably danger-
ous" requirement. 5 ' The court stated that "strict liability should not
be imposed upon a manufacturer when injury results from a use of
its product that is not reasonably foreseeable."52 This requirement of
reasonable foreseeability was incorporated in the revised jury instruc-
tions adopted after Cronin;53 the addition of this element to the ex-
isting requirement of proximate cause in the jury instructions makes
the new causation requirements in California products liability cases a
strong one. In practice, however, few products liability cases turn on
whether proximate or legal cause is required. Rather, controversy
in products liability cases centers more often around the other element
of strict liability in tort, a "defect."
V. WHAT CONSTITUTES A DEFECT?
"A defect may be variously defined, and as yet no definition has
48. BAJI, supra note 23, No. 3.75, defines proximate cause as "a cause which,
in natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury, and without which the injury
would not have occurred."
49. Id., No. 3.76, defines legal cause as "a cause which is a substantial factor in
bringing about the injury."
50. See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 79 (4th ed. 1971). It is suggested there that proximate
cause standards should be more restrictive in strict liability cases than in negligence
cases, since the strict liability defendant may be less culpable. See also R. CARTRIGHT &
J. COTCHETT, supra note 27, at 436:
The term "proximate cause" has led to confusion and the recommended term in a
products liability case is "legal cause." This follows the decisions that talk in terms
of "substantial factor" as a test for causation. This [test] is stated in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTs § 431 (1965).
51. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
52. 8 Cal. 3d at 127, 501 P.2d at 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
53. See note 26 supra.
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been formulated that would resolve all cases or that is universally
agreed upon."54 This frank admission by the California Supreme
Court accurately summarizes the problem of defining a "defect."
Courts and commentators have generally recognized three major ways
to define "defect" involving concepts of "unreasonably dangerous,"
"deviation form the norm" and "reasonable fitness for intended
purpose.".5
A. "Unreasonably Dangerous"
Under this approach, the social utility of a dangerous product, or of
a dangerous aspect of a product, is weighed against the total social
cost of eliminating the danger.56 If the utility outweighs the cost,
then the useful activity is protected by the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement. The danger in question need not result from use of the
product for its normal purpose; foreseeable danger arising from
common but abnormal uses of a product must be weighed also. Thus,
a product can be reasonably fit for its normal purpose yet unreason-
ably dangerous (defective) when used for other purposes. 57 It is not
clear whether Cronin precludes reliance on the "unreasonably danger-
ous" definition of "defect." The court warned that its abolition of the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement as an element of strict liability
in tort is not to be sidestepped easily: "[M]erely proclaiming that
the phrase 'defective condition unreasonably dangerous' requires only
a single finding would not purge that phrase of its negligence com-
plexion." 58 On the other hand, the court probably did not intend to go
54. Jiminez, 4 Cal. 3d at 384, 482 P.2d at 684, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 772-73.
55. See, e.g., Traynor, supra note 21; Jiminez, 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 769.
56. This is the approach taken by the RESTATEMENT. Although § 402A does not
define "defect" for strict liability purposes, it is fair to attribute the "unreasonably
dangerous" definition to it because no other policy than that served by the "unreasonably
dangerous" definition is furthered by the RESTATEMENT'S additional requirement of a
defect. See Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. LJ. 5, 15 (1965).
Suggested factors to weigh in determining whether or not to hold the seller liable in-
clude: (1) Need for product; (2) availability of safer substitutes; (3) probability and
seriousness of injury; (4) obviousness of danger; (5) knowledge and expectations of the
public regarding the danger; (6) avoidability of injury through careful handling of
product and (7) cost of effectively eliminating or reducing danger. Id. at 17.
57. See P. Keeton, Products Liability-Inadequacy of Information, 48 TEXAs L.
REV. 398, 399 (1970).
58. "8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
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so far as to eliminate completely the policy of weighing of dangers
against costs which is often sought to be furthered by the "unreason-
ably dangerous" requirement. The Cronin court recognized that the
definition of defectiveness in California inheres in the "cluster of use-
ful precedents" provided by past products liability cases"9 and did not
suggest that it rejected those cases which used the weighing approach
under an "unreasonably dangerous" definition of "defect." Cronin
thus aimed more at keeping the term "unreasonably dangerous" out of
jury instructions as an element of plaintiff's case to be proved than at
eliminating the policy considerations which inspired it.
B. "Deviation from the Norm"
"Deviation from the norm" as a definition of defectiveness has
well-known shortcomings. Products with patently dangerous design
defects may be the norm in a particular industry; it would follow,
under the "deviation from the norm" definition, that such a product is
not defective. Yet it is clear from Luque v. McLean,60 decided the
same day as Cronin, that the manufacturer will be held accountable
for injuries proximately caused by poorly designed products, and that
such products are "defective." The definition also poses the problem
of deciding which control group should be deemed to be the "norm"
against which the product in question is to be compared. An addi-
tional problem is posed by the plaintiff whose personal deviation from
the norm causes him to be injured by a product. Courts generally will
hold the manufacturer liable for failure to warn if the injurious inter-
action of its product with plaintiff's "defect" (e.g., an allergy) is suffi-
ciently foreseeable.61 The "deviation from the norm" definition, by
failing to include within its scope these injury-producing aspects of a
product, does not consistently predict the result at which courts ar-
rive. However, while a product's conformity to the norm does not
mean that it will not be found defective, its flawed condition or other
negative deviation from the norm is a relatively dependable indicium
59. Id., n.16.
60. 8Cal. 3d 136,501 P.2d 1163, 104Cal. Rptr. 443.
61. See W. PROSSER, ToRTrs § 102 at 670 (4th ed. 1971). But see Harris v. Belton,
258 Cal. App. 2d at 611, 65 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
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of defectiveness. The layman's understanding of "defect" probably
conforms closely to this "deviation from the norm" definition; the
product is one of inferior quality due to some miscarriage in the man-
ufacturing process.
Also, if that product, as a proximate result of its inferior quality,
causes injury, it would be defective under the "unreasonably danger-
ous" definition previously discussed. In a defect defined as a deviation
from the norm, the danger resulting from the deviation is not an una-
voidable feature of the product itself, although it may in fact be una-
voidable given the limitations of the manufacturing process. The costs
of errors in the manufacturing process, however unavoidable, are allo-
cated to the manufacturer under the strict liability doctrine. As observed
in the Restatement § 402A, Comment i, the manufacturer will not
be held responsible for the unavoidable dangers of good whiskey, but
it will be responsible for the dangers of whiskey adulterated, no
matter how unavoidably, during the manufacturing process. Thus, in
the case of manufacturing defects the "unreasonably dangerous" test
and the "deviation from the norm" test should yield the same results.
The latter test, however, does not adequately cover design defects,
which are present in a whole product line and hence are "normal."
Although the "deviation from the norm" definition does not cover de-
sign defects and is thus narrower in scope than the other two defini-
tions, it frequently is used because it is more amenable to conclusive
proof, where evidence is available, than are the more vague and
subjective definitions, "unreasonably dangerous" and "unfit for in-
tended purpose."
C. Reasonable Fitness for Intended Purpose
Reasonable fitness for intended purpose and merchantability are, of
course, concepts rooted in the law of contract and warranty, and their
use in defining defectiveness for the purposes of tort liability is the
result of the evolution of strict liability in tort from principles of im-
plied warranty.6 2 While many contract limitations on plaintiff's re-
covery (privity, notice etc.) have been discarded from the law of strict
62. See Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer in California, 18 HAsnNGS LJ. 9
(1966); Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402 and the Uniform Commerical
Code, 20 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970); see generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
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liability in tort, warranty concepts of defectiveness often have been
borrowed intact. Dean Keeton argues that commercial standards of
defectiveness should not be applied in cases involving strict liability in
tort because in ascertaining the manufacturer's liability for personal
injuries, the dangerous nature of the product, not the disappointment
of commercial expectations, is at issue 53 Of course, a large area of
overlap between those products found unreasonably dangerous and
those found unmerchantable and unfit for intended purposes undoubt-
edly exists.64 Although some authorities contend that any product not
reasonably fit for its intended purpose is defective in both the war-
ranty and strict liability senses,65 even those arguing for the broadest
definition of "defect" for the purposes of strict liability in tort would
agree with Traynor's statement: "Defect becomes a fiction, however, if
it means nothing more than a condition causing physical injury." 66
In Jiminez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,67 the California Supreme
Court recognized the impossibility of settling upon one definition of
"defect" for all purposes. The court cited examples of its prior appli-
cation of all three of the above mentioned definitions and implied that
the definition chosen for submission to a jury will depend upon the
facts of each case.68 The Cronin court retained this open approach to
the elements of "defectiveness" 69 and gave no sign that it considered
a tightening of the definition of "defect" necessary to compensate for the
elimination of the requirement that the product be "unreasonably
dangerous."
63. See Keeton, Products Liability-Some Observations About Allocation of
Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329, 1336 (1966).
64. See note 27 supra.
65. R. CARTRIGHT &J. COTCHETT, supra note 27.
66. Traynor, supra note 21, at 372.
67. 4 Cal. 3d 379, 482 P.2d 681, 93 Cal. Rptr. 769 (1971). Jiminez dealt primarily
with the important question whether or not the res ipsa loquitur doctrine can be applied
to infer the existence of a defect from an injury. The court in Jiminez did not disturb the
rule that circumstantial evidence, but not res ipsa loquitur, can be used, to establish a
defect. (McCarter v. Norton Co., 263 Cal. App. 2d 402, 69 Cal. Rptr. 493 (1968)). But
the court did allow res ipsa loquitur to be used in the related proof of manufacturer's
negligence in causing the defect. It held that the joining of a strict liability theory with a
negligence theory concerning the same defect did not preclude plaintiff from seeking a
res ipsa instruction in the latter count.
68. 4 Cal. 3d at 384, 482 P.2d at 684, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 772.
69. 8 Cal. 3d at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442, n.16:
We recognize, of course, the difficulty inherent in giving content to the defective-
ness standard. However, as Justice Traynor notes, there is now a cluster of useful
precedents to supersede the confusing decisions based on indiscriminate invocation
of sales and warranty law. (Traynor, supra, 32TENN. L. REV. 363, 373).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court's abolition in Cronin of the "unrea-
sonably dangerous" requirement significantly lightens plaintiffs
burden of proof in products liability cases by eliminating an element
suggestive of negligence. Since elimination of the plaintiffs need to
prove negligence elements was a major reason for the introduction of
strict liability in tort,70 the purpose of that doctrine is furthered by this
opinion. The legitimate interests of defendant manufacturers and
sellers have not been compromised by the Cronin decision, for plain-
tiff must still prove the existence of a defect and its proximate causa-
tion of his injury.
The "unreasonably dangerous" requirement has three possible ex-
planations, none of which justifies its retention by the courts: (1) Man-
ufacturers of desirable but unavoidably unsafe products are ade-
quately protected because their products are not necessarily defective;
(2) "unreasonably dangerous" is descriptive only and has no separate
legal content when used in failure to warn cases; and (3) the manufac-
turer is protected from becoming an "insurer" of his product by the
requirement that plaintiff show existence of a defect and proximate
causation.
. Some commentators predict that the proof requirements of defec-
tiveness and causation will be steadily eroded until a system similar
to workmen's compensation is established in the field of products lia-
bility.7 1 Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp. can be viewed as a step down
the road to manufacturers' "absolute" liability for injuries connected
with their products, for it does lighten plaintiffs burden in proving
defectiveness by eliminating the additional "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement. But Cronin does not represent a turning point; it merely
effects the policy of eliminating required showings of negligence in
products liability cases which the California court announced in 1963
70. 8 Cal. 3d at 132, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. See Escola v. Coca
Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d at 461-62, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (Traynor, J. concurring) and
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
71. See Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Strict Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077, 1094
(1965). For a discussion of the interaction between workmen's compensation and strict
tort liability see Comment, Workmen's Compensation: Toward a Stricter Liability for
Enterprise, 6 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 190 (1972).
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in Greenman and which the Restatement attempted to embody in §
402A. Accordingly, other jurisdictions which have embraced the doc-
trine of strict liability in tort, such as Washington, may also wish to
reconsider the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement in the Restate-
ment § 402A.7 2
Charles L. Coleman
72. A New Jersey court recently adopted the reasoning of Cronin and held that:
IT] he additional element of "unreasonable danger" is not a valid part of the con-
cept of strict liability in tort in the State of New Jersey.... [The court] there-
fore adopts as law § 402A, minus the phrase, "unreasonably dangerous" and minus
any necessity for the jury to find that the product was in a "defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous."
Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 NJ. Super. 599, 601, 304 A.2d 562, 564 (1973).
The Washington equivalent of Greenman is Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wn. 2d
522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969), noted in 45 WASH. L. REv. 441 (1970). In Ulmer, which states
the current products liability law of Washington, the Washington Supreme Court
adopted the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A as the products liability rule
for the state, seemingly including the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement:
On a new trial, however, an instruction stating the rule according to RESTATEMENT
SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (I965) should be given, rather than instruction No. 6,
which does not make it clear that the manufacturer is liable only for defects which
create an unreasonable risk of harm.
75 Wn. 2d at 532, 452 P.2d at 735.
The rule embodied in the rejected Instruction No. 6 seems identical to that announced
in Cronin; the instruction reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
If you find that there was a defect . . . which existed at the time of the
sale . . . and the plaintiff was injured as a proximate result of such defect, then I
instruct you to find for the plaintiff and against the defendant.
Id. at 524, 452, P.2d at 730.
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